Let M be a single s-t network of parallel links with load dependent latency functions shared by an infinite number of selfish users. This may yield a Nash equilibrium with unbounded Coordination Ratio [12, 26] . A Leader can decrease the coordination ratio by assigning flow αr on M , and then all Followers assign selfishly the (1 − α)r remaining flow. This is a Stackelberg Scheduling Instance (M, r, α), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It was shown [23] that it is weakly NP-hard to compute the optimal Leader's strategy.
INTRODUCTION
In large scale networks such as Internet the users/providers have freedom on how to route their load. This allows them to make their choices according to their own individual performance objectives, bringing the network to fixed points most times worse than the optimum one [6] . Such selfish behavior is being studied with the notion of Nash Equilibrium in the mathematical framework of Game Theory [5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 23, 27] .
As a measure of how inefficient is the Nash equilibrium compared to the overall system's optimum, the notion of coordination ratio was introduced in the seminal paper of [12] . This work has been extended (price of anarchy is another equivalent term) in [4, 3, 8, 14, 21, 20, 24, 23, 26, 22] .
To improve the performance of the system under selfish behavior a great variety of methodologies have been considered so far. These methodologies intent to bring the system to fixed points closer to its optimum performance. The network administrator or designer can define prices, rules or even construct the network, in such a way that induces near optimal performance when the users selfishly use the system. This can be achieved through pricing policies [2] , algorithmic mechanisms [7, 17, 16] , network design [9, 22] , or routing small portion of the traffic centrally [13, 10, 23] .
Particulary interesting is the last approach where the network manager affects the non-cooperative game. The manager has the ability to control centrally a part of the system resources, while the remaining resources are used by the selfish users. This approach has been studied through Stackelberg or Leader-Follower games [13, 1, 10, 11, 23, 29] . One player (Leader) controls a portion of the system's jobs and assigns them to the system (Stackelberg assignment) . The rest of the users (Followers) having in mind the assignment of the Leader react selfishly and reach a Nash equilibrium. The assignment of Leader and Followers is called Stackelberg Equilibrium. The goal of the Leader is to induce an optimal or near optimal Stackelberg Equilibrium.
Motivation
(i) Single-commodity networks with parallel links. Consider a system M of parallel links and a total of flow r to be scheduled on M , denoted as a Scheduling Instance (M, r). Given an scheduling instance (M, r), there is a unique Optimum assignment O of flow r on system M minimizing the total cost C(O) incurred on system M . We study the case of an infinite number of selfish users, each assigning its in-finitesimal small portion of total flow r on links in M of currently minimum delay. Let the cost C(N ) of the Nash assignment N on the scheduling instance (M, r). Then,
C(N ) = (M,r) × C(O)
( 1 ) where (M,r) depends only on instance (M, r) and can be arbitrarily larger than 1 [26] , but if all links in M have linear load depended latency functions, then (M,r) ≤ 4/3 [12] . We try to obtain a more clear picture of this degradation on system's performance, measured by the factor (M,r) , by studying Stackelberg Scheduling Instances as in [23] , and as in [10] where we focus on the case of an infinite number of users. According to [23, 10] there is a central authority (Leader) that controls a portion 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the overall flow r to be assigned on system M , while the rest (1 − α)r of the flow is assigned by the infinite self-optimizing users (Followers) on M . In [23] this is denoted as a Stackelberg Scheduling Instance (M, r, α), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This means that each scheduling instance (M, r) corresponds to a family of Stackelberg scheduling instances (M, r, α), parameterized with respect to α ∈ [0, 1]. Given a Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α), the goal of the Leader is to find an assignment (strategy) S of his flow αr on M , such that to induce a Followers's assignment T of the remaining (1 − α)r flow, with cost C(S + T ) near to the optimum C(O) one. That is
Let us use the name "a posteriori anarchy cost" for the quantity (M,r,α) . Note that the a-posteriori cost depends on the strategy chosen by the Leader and on the portion of the flow that she controls. More precisely, in [23] it was proved that (M,r,α) ≤ . From Expression (2), we realize that the portion α captured by the Leader "pays" an upper bound on system's degradation factor (M,r,α) which is smaller than the plain one in Expression (1), see also [13] . More precisely, [23] presented the algorithm LLF that, on input a Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α), computes a Leader's strategy S inducing Nash assignment T with performance guarantee C(S + T ) ≤ 1 α C(O). However, on the same Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α) there may exist a better Leader'strategy S inducing T such that C(S + T ) < C(S + T ), see footnote 6 in [23] . This means that LLF cannot always compute the optimal strategy. Also, there may exist a strategy S , escaping from LLF, such that C(S + T ) = C(O). Such limitations are depicted in the negative result in [23] stating that the problem of computing the Optimal Stackelberg strategy on a given Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α) is weakly NP -hard.
(ii) Arbitrary single-commodity nets. Finally, an important question of [23] that motivated us is the extension of the above results to arbitrary network graphs, closer to the nature of real networks. Given an arbitrary single sourcedestination (s, t)-network G, can a Leader wisely assign his αr portion on some edges, inducing a selfish s → t routing of the remaining flow with best possible cost? In [25] Appendix B.3 Proposition B.3.1, exhibited a simple 4-nodes graph where no strategy can guarantee cost 1 α times the optimum one. Notably, this 4-node graph is reminiscent to the one of Braess's Paradox. To the best of our knowledge, no performance guarantee as a function of the centrally controlled portion α has been established for arbitrary (s, t)-networks.
(iii) Arbitrary multi-commodity nets. Even less is known for Stackelberg strategies on arbitrary networks.
Our results
(i) Single-commodity network with parallel links. Our first main result is the polynomial-time algorithm OpTop that on input a scheduling instance (M, r) computes the minimum portion βM of flow r needed by a Leader to induce the Optimum cost C(O) on M , as well as the Leader's Optimal Stackelberg strategy (see the open question in [28] page 28). In other words, for an arbitrary scheduling instance (M, r) and arbitrary continuous, differentiable and strictly increasing latency functions we prove that for all Stackelberg scheduling instances of the form (M, r, α ≥ βM ) a Leader can enforce the Optimum cost C(O) on M , and the problem of computing the Optimum Stackelberg strategy is in P . In view of Expression (2), for such instances the factor (M,r,α≥β M ) is precisely 1. On the contrary, for all Stackelberg sceduling instances (M, r, α < βM ) it is not possible for a Leader to enforce the Optimum cost. Then in Expression (2) we get that (M,r,α<β M ) > 1, which means that such Stackelberg scheduling instances are the really hard ones and we can try to attack these by sophisticated fully polynomial approximation schemes as the ones presented in [13] . Such non-optimizing behavior was presented also in [10] , for the restricted case of M/M/1 systems of distinct links. Notably, if such M/M/1 systems contain small groups of highly appealing links or there are large groups of identical links then βM may be significantly small.
Single-commodity network with parallel links, focusing on the hard region. Trying to understand further the underlying complexity of hard instances (M, r, α < βM ), we started to investigate systems of links, with appropriate load dependent latency functions that, hopefully, may admit efficient computation of the optimal strategy. Our motivation is the case of simple followers (which is identical to an infinite number of followers that we consider here) studied in Section 8 in [10] . We compute the optimal Stackelberg strategy on hard instances (M, r, α < βM ) for any network with parallel links M = {M1, . . . , Mm} where each link Mi ∈ M has linear latency i(x) = aix + bi satisfying the property: b1 ≤ . . . ≤ bm and a1 = . . . = am.
(ii) Arbitrary single-commodity nets. Our second main result is an algorithm that efficiently computes the minimum portion βG of Leader's flow, sufficient to induce the optimum routing of flow r from a source-vertex s to a sink t on any network G. Despite the negative results presented in [23, 25] , we can modify OpTop to work on input an arbitrary network G. Our algorithm also computes the associated optimal strategy of the Leader.
(iii) Arbitrary multi-commodity nets. We conjecture that our results also hold for k commodities on arbitrary nets.
Outline of the paper
In Section 1.4 we describe the model that we use for the case of parallel links and the corresponding one for arbitrary networks. In Section 2 we present the polynomial-time algorithm OpTop for parallel links. In Section 2.2 we prove its optimality for parallel links. In Section 2.3 we give a slightly different algorithm for arbitrary networks. We take care of the Braess graph as an example. We present our results in this order for reasons of clarity. In Section 3 we focus on the hard region (M, r, α < βM ) of parallel links. denote the assignment of jobs to the links in M such that
The Model and the problem
The minimum cost is incurred by a unique assignment O ∈ R m + , called the Optimum assignment. The unique assignment N ∈ R m + defines a Nash equilibrium, if no user can find a loaded machine with < latency than any other machine.
Arbitrary Networks:
A network is as a directed graph G(V, E) with set of vertices V and edges E. There are k source-destination vertex pairs (s1, t1), . . . , (s k , t k ) and no self loops are allowed. Pi is the set of all paths amongst (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , k, and
The amount of flow fe on edge e ∈ E is the flow it receives from all paths in P. If we focus on the flow of a specific source-destination pair (si, ti) then we let f i the restriction of f to Pi, i = 1, . . . , k. The total of flow wishing to travel through source-destination pair (si, ti) is ri and f is feasible if the flow it assigns on each path Pi is ri. If flow fe traverses edge e it incurs latency e(xe), where e(·) is increasing, differentiable and fe e(fe) convex on fe. The latency of a path P ∈ Pi with respect to flow f is the sum of its edge-latencies P (f ) = P e∈P e(fe). The cost of a flow f is C(f ) = P e∈E e(fe)fe = P P ∈P P (f )fP . The unique Optimal flow f * is the one minimizing the cost C(·) of scheduling flow r on graph G and due to convexity properties can be efficiently computed. We have a Nash equilibrium on a network G if an only if for every commodity i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and paths P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP 1 > 0 we have
In other words, in each source-destination pair (si, ti) no flow in a loaded path can find any other path from si to ti experiencing less latency.
Problem:
The input is a scheduling instance (M, r) where M is either m parallel links or an s−t network. The question is to compute efficiently the minimum portion of the flow controlled by the Leader (and the associated strategy of the Leader) to induce the overall optimum cost on M .
OUR ALGORITHM AND ITS OPTIMALITY
Single-commodity network with parallel links. In this section we present algorithm OpTop that computes the minimum flow that should be controlled by the Leader in order to induce the overall optimum on a given instance (M, r). Let O := o1, . . . , om the optimum assignment and N := n1, . . . , nm the Nash assignment on (M, r). Intuitively 1 , OpTop initially loads si = oi to each link Mi ∈ M with ni < oi, that is, to all links not appealing to the selfish users. Then it discards all these not appealing links as soon as it loads them optimally. The remaining flow is assigned recursively by OpTop in exactly the same fashion to the simplified subnetwork of links. It terminates as soon as it encounters a simplified subnetwork with all of its links optimally loaded. In Section 2.3 we generalize Theorem 1 for arbitrary network topologies and the same standard class of latency functions.
Useful machinery
Single-commodity network with parallel links. We denote the corresponding Nash and Optimum assignments on an instance (M, r) as N = n1, . . . , nm with P m i=1 ni = r, and O = o1, . . . , om with P m i=1 oi = r. We give a more useful definition for the Nash assignment N .
We denote as Stackelberg strategy S an assignment S = s1, . . . , sm of flow
Definition 2. Given Stackelberg strategy S = s1, . . . , sm with P m i=1 si = βr and β ∈ [0, 1], the assignment T = t1, . . . , tm of the remaining flow
The Stackelberg Stategy S induces the Nash assignment
Luckily, by the Nash assignment N of the users, all links may end up optimum-loaded. In this way, N ≡ O and the cost C(N ) of the system is minimized, that is C(N ) = C(O). In general N ≡ O, since the selfish users prefer and thus over-load fast links, while dislike and under-load slower ones, increasing the cost C(N ) > C(O). The crucial role of strategy S is to wisely pre-assign load si ≥ 0 to each link Mi ∈ M . This is successful to the extent that the induced Nash assignment T made by the users will assign an additional load ti ≥ 0 to each Mi, yielding the nice property si + ti = oi for each i = 1, . . . , m. Intuitively, strategy S biasses the initial Nash assignment N to the induced one T , in a way that S + T ≡ O, minimizing the induced overall cost C(S + T ) = C(O) of system M . It is convenient to state the following easy proposition. 
N which is impossible, since N is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we reach a contradiction since we get r ≥
That is, in the same fashion, we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 2 describes each Stackelberg strategy S inducing Nash assignment T with cost C(S + T ) = C(N ). In other words, Theorem 2 describes exactly all those useless strategies that induce cost indifferent from C(N ) 
N , for each Mj ∈ M with tj > 0. This means that T is a Nash equilibrium on system M S and also S + T ≡ N .
In view of the negative result of Theorem 2, a natural question concerns the properties that a Stackelberg strategy must have in order to induce cost = C(N ). We answer this question on Theorem 3 and its generalization Lemma 1 below. Before this, we give a convenient definition.
Definition 5. Each Stackelberg strategy S that satisfies Theorem 2 is called useless-strategy, otherwise is called usefulstrategy.
Theorem 3 states that any link Mi ∈ M receiving load si ≥ ni by a strategy S (while there is no link Mj ∈ M with load sj < nj ) will become non appealing for the subsequent selfish assignment T of the users. That is, for each Mi ∈ M assigned load si ≥ ni, its induced load by the Nash assignment T equals ti = 0. Intuitively, in the induced Nash equilibrium T , the dictated load si ≥ ni by strategy S to link Mi will remain "frozen" to si, i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. 
On the other hand, each Mj ∈ M S − receiving induced load tj ≥ 0 experiences the same (since sj = 0) as the initial (that is, without applying strategy S) latency
In the sequel, the induced Nash assignment T by strategy S assigns the remaining flow on M
Having in mind (4) and (5), the crucial observation is that even if all the remaining flow that appears in LHS of (5) (5)) it holds
By (3) and (6) 
However, here we do not have the nice fact as in (4) for the link latencies in M S − (since now sj = 0 ). We can circumvent this as follows. The induced Nash assignment T assigns on system M the remaining flow that equals
where the rightmost inequality stems from the fact that
Now, we prove that even if the flow r 
Applying Proposition 1, we conclude that for each loaded
N and using (7) the lemma is proved. 
(see its validity below) otherwise we set t = 0 already has load sj due to S such that n
and the lemma follows. The Inequality (11) can be proved as follows. Given strategy S, let the subsystem M
In this way we get X
Given strategy S , Theorem 2 applies on assigning selfishly the flow that appears on the RHS of (14) (14) X
on subsystem M S − . From Proposition 1, on selfisly assigning the flow in LHS of (14) 
In Section 2.2 we apply Theorem 3, Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 to discard the links with frozen load sj = oj ≥ nj and simplify the initial game. Clearly, such links will never be affected by the induced selfish play of the users on the rest of links. Therefore, using Proposition 2, we focus on the remaining links with load under S that equals si < ni, which may be affected by the selfish users, trying to find a subsequent partial Stackelberg strategy on them that will induce the optimum cost. N = n1, . . . , nm on (M, r) . 1 may assign to any other link Mi = Mj. Therefore, Mj will never reduce its load to the optimum value oj, and thus the system M will never converge to its overall optimum assignment O.
The optimal evolution of
In the same fashion, applying Lemma 1, if during Phase 1 strategy S 1 assigns load s 
Phase
. Finally, OpTop terminates as soon as it reaches a Phase i0 where the simplified subsystem M i 0 has the property
and outputs the minimum possible flow βM needed to impose the overall optimum on system M that equals βM =
Modified OpTop for arbitrary networks (Algorithm MOP)
We consider an arbitrary network G with single-source vertex s and sink t such that the latency function e(·) per edge e is strictly increasing on flow xe, differentiable and xe e(xe) is convex (i.e. standard latencies). There is a total of flow r to be routed from s to t. The unique optimum routing O of total flow r from vertex s to t can be computed in polynomial time, on any such network G, see in [25] Section 2.3 Fact 2.3.6. This also holds for the Nash assignment N on G, selfishly routed from vertex s to t, see [25] Section 2.5, Remark 2.
(d).
The approach: Consider the optimum assignment O of flow r that wishes to travel from source vertex s to sink t. O assigns flow oe incurring latency e(oe) per edge e ∈ G. Let Ps→t the set of all s → t paths. We can compute in polynomial time the shortest paths in Ps→t with respect to costs e(oe) per edge e ∈ G. That is, the paths that given flow assignment O attain latency: minP ∈Ps→t`P e∈P e(oe)´i.e., minimize their latency. It is crucial to observe that, if we want the induced Nash assignment by the Stackelberg strategy to attain the optimum cost, then these shortest paths are the only choice for selfish users that eager to travel from s to t. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the optimum assignment O determines the minimum part of flow which can be selfishly scheduled on these shortest paths. More precisely, let As→t = {e ∈ G : e belongs in at least one shortest path from, s → t} the set of all "fast" edges in paths from s to t. Observe that the flow o e assigned by the optimum assignment O on any "slow" edge e ∈ As→t has incentive to change its path (since it is not a shortest one). Then, for each e ∈ As→t, a Stackelberg strategy must freeze its flow o e on it. Otherwise, selfish users traversing e will opt for a shortest path and eventually ruin the overall optimum assignment O. However, for each fast edge e ∈ As→t the flow oe assigned by O has no incentive to change path (it currently is on a shortest one). Therefore, it is useless to employ any Stackelberg strategy on any e ∈ As→t. We conclude that the minimum flow sufficient by a Leader to induce the optimum cost equals P e ∈As→t o e . It is easy, but tedious, to extend our proof methodology of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in order to fully justify our argument of correctness as stated above. 
Algorithm
Then P0 = s → v → w → t (see [25] pp. 143, 5th-3th lines before the end), irrespectively of the flow traversing it. ∀ e ∈ E such that e ∈ P0 MOP assigns flow oe. Therefore edge s → w gets flow os→w and edge v → t flow ov→t, according to (18) . The selfish routing starts. On startingnode s all flow r = 1 will opt to travel trough most wanted path P0. However, on node s the Leader (according to his strategy dictated by the MOP) forces os→w of r = 1 to travel via s → w ∈ P0 (which is an ugly edge and no one wants it). The remaining selfish r − os→w flow will still opt for the most preferred path P0 and will traverse through edge s → v (this flow is optimal for s → v). The Leader comes up as soon this flow arrives at node v. He pursues (according to his strategy dictated by MOP) another ov→t flow to traverse the ugly v → t ∈ P0 edge, and finally reach the precious destination t. Now, the remaining r − os→w − ov→t is free to opt for edge v → w ∈ P0 which is still highly appealing (this flow is optimal for v → w). A great surprise arises as soon as these r − os→w − ov→t liberians reach node w: they meet their os→w fellows. Now the r − ov→t flow will keep on walking via w → t (this is optimal for w → t) and reach destination t, where they meet their ov→t friends. Thus the coordination ratio equals to 1, since all edges get the optimal flows depicted in (18) . 
